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I STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant, Mobile Echocardiography, Inc. ("MEI"), has appealed the following
orders entered by the Fourth District Court, Utah County, Utah (the "Trial Court"): (i)
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Regarding Interpleading Funds entered
March 4, 2009 (the "March Order") (attached to MEFs Brief as Addendum 1); and (ii)
Order Denying MEFs Motion to Reconsider and Granting MEFs Motion for
Certification as a Final Order entered July 21, 2009 (the "July Order") (attached to MEFs
Brief as Addendum 2).

The March Order and the July Order awarded Appellee,

DAT&K, LLC ("DAT&K")1, $442,768.03 that had been interplead with the Trial Court
(the "Disputed Funds"). This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §§78A-4-103(2).
II STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Gregory Barton & Swapp, P.C ("GBS") filed a petition for dissolution in the Trial
Court, and Mark D. Hashimoto was appointed the receiver for GBS. See Petition for
Dissolution of Gregory Barton & Swapp, P.C [R. 000014]; Receivership Order [R.
000207-195]. The Disputed Funds were withheld from recoveries by GBS's clients in
connection with settlements of their lawsuits against the maker of the diet drug Fen-Phen.
Both DAT&K and MEI claimed the Disputed Funds, and, therefore, the Disputed Funds
were interplead with the Trial Court.

1

DAT&K is the successor in interest to Advocate Capital, Inc.
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GBS was indebted to DAT&K, and DAT&K held a security interest in all monies
owed to GBS by its clients for attorney's fees and payment of costs and expenses
incurred by GBS in connection with the Fen-Phen cases. GBS engaged MEI to perform
echocardiography services for GBS in connection with the Fen-Phen cases. GBS agreed
to pay MEI for those services when GBS received payment from its clients.

GBS's

clients agreed to pay GBS for expenses incurred in connection the Fen-Phen cases
including, but not limited to, expenses incurred for echocardiography services.
DAT&K contended that GBS's clients owed the Disputed Funds to GBS as
payment of expenses incurred by GBS, and, therefore, DAT&K's security interest
attached to the Disputed Funds. On the other hand, MEI contended that GBS's clients
owed the Disputed Funds directly to MEI, rather than to GBS, and, therefore, DAT&K's
security interest did not attach to the Disputed Funds. Following an evidentiary hearing,
the Trial Court found that GBS's clients owed the Disputed Funds to GBS as payment of
expenses incurred by GBS, rather than to MEI, and, therefore, DAT&K's security interest
attached to the Disputed Funds.
MEI misstates the issues in this case. First, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-203 has no
applicability to this case. DAT&K's security agreement is governed by Tennessee law,
see Trial Exhibit 1, at p. 7 [R. 3995, 4106], and, therefore, the issue of whether
DAT&K's security interest attached to the Disputed Funds is governed by Tennessee
law, see Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-301, Official Comment 2 (the law applicable to issue
of attachment and enforcement is the law specified in the security agreement); Tenn.
Code Ann.
105562-000003
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provides that a security interest attaches when the secured party gives value, the debtor
has rights in the collateral and the debtor executes a security agreement, Even if Utah
law were applicable, which it is not, Utah Code § 70A-9a-203 and Term. Code Ann. § 479-203 are substantively the same.2 Copies of Section 70A-9a-203 and Section 47-9-203
are attached hereto as an Addendum.
Second, and more importantly, this case is not ahont whether a secured creditor
can make a claim to money in which the debtor that granted the security interest never
had ownership in the first place. DAT&K did not contend, and the Trial Court did not
hold, that a security interest may attach to property in which the debtor does not have
rights. DAT&K and the Trial Court expressly recognized that DAT&K's security interest
attached to the Disputed Funds only if GBS had rights in the Disputed Funds. See 5-5-08
Trans, at p. 56 [R.6535]. The Trial Court found that DAT&K had rights in the Disputed
Funds because GBS's clients owed the Disputed Funds to GBS as payment of expenses
incurred by GBS for echocardiography services.

The only issue on appeal is whether

that finding is clearly erroneous.
In Parduhn v. Bennett 2005 UT 22, 112 P.3d 495 (Ut. 2005), the Utah Supreme
Court set forth the standard of review applicable to the Trial Court's finding that GBS
had rights in the Disputed Funds:
The standard of review applicable to findings of fact merits separate
discussion. Not all findings of fact are created equal: some are
2

MEI does not dispute that DAT&K gave value or that GBS authenticated a security
agreement describing the collateral. MEFs only argument is that GBS did not have rights
in the Disputed Funds and, therefore, DAT&K's security interest did not attach to the
Disputed Funds.
105562-000003
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ultimate findings of fact, upon which the resolution of a particular
issue turns, while others are subsidiary facts supporting the ultimate
findings. While we review both for clear error, RHN Corp., 2004 UT
60 at^l 35, 96 P.3d 935, we have recognized that findings of fact "must
show that the court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is
supported by, the evidence. The findings should be sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."
Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison 2003 UT 14, <1 28, 70 P.3d 35
(internal quotations omitted). Because a finding of fact need only be
supported by sufficient subsidiary facts to justify it, one erroneous
subsidiary finding does not necessarily render the ultimate factual
finding erroneous as well.
To successfully challenge an ultimate finding of fact, "an appellant
must first marshal ail the evidence in support of the finding and then
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court
below." ChenError! Bookmark not defined, v Stewart, 2004 UT 82,
^ 76, 100 P.3d 1177 (internal quotations omitted). An appellant "must
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very
findings the appellant resists." Id. at \ 11 (internal quotations omitted).
Moreover, an appellant may not simply review the evidence presented
at trial, nor may she "reargue the factual case [she] presented in the
Trial Court." Id. If an appellant argues that no evidence supports a
factual finding, the burden to marshal does not then shift to the
appellee; rather, the appellee may prove that the appellant did not meet
her marshaling burden by presenting a "scintilla" of evidence
supporting the district court's finding. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan
Mfa. Corp., 2002 UI 94, « 22, 54 P.3d 1177. A challenge to an
ultimate finding of fact is tantamount to a claim that there are
insufficient subsidiary facts to support that finding. Accordingly, a
challenge to a subsidiary finding is really a challenge to the ultimate
finding it supports. A party challenging a subsidiary finding must
therefore marshal evidence in support of the ultimate finding.
2005 UT atfflf24-25, 112 P.2d at 502-03. If the appellant fails to properly marshal the evidence,
the appellate court assumes that the evidence supports the trial court's findings. See Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f3, 100 P.3d 1177, 1196 (Ut. 2004).

105562-000003
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In the instant case, the Trial Court's findings of fact hinged, in part, on its determination
that MEI's witnesses, Mr, Keith Barton and Mr, Alan Fidler, were not credible. This Court must
defer to the Trial Court's determination that MEI's witnesses were not credible.
To the extent that findings of fact are based on a determination of
credibility, we defer to the trial court. See Gardner v. Madsen, 949
P.2d 785, 790 (Utah Ct.App.1997). The trial court has the
responsibility to determine the credibility of testimony. "A trial
court's factual findings [regarding defendant's competency] will
not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous." State v.
Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 2001 UT 19,1} 45, 415 Utah Adv, Rep. 29.
"We give deference to the trial court's factual findings because of
its superior position to assess credibility." Id.
State v. Visser, UT App. 215, ^ 12, 31 P.2d 584, 586 (Ut. App. 2001).
Ill STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GBS, the Williams Bailey Law Firm, L.L.P. ("Williams Bailey"), Blizzard,
McCarthy & Nabers, L.L.P. ("BM&N"), Keith L. Barton ("Barton"), and DAT&K
entered into that Settlement Agreement dated March 7, 2007 (the "Texas Firms
Settlement Agreement") regarding the proceeds from the settlement of the Fen-Phen
cases. See Trial Exhibit 14 [R. 4106, 3995]. The Trial Court approved the Texas Firms
Settlement Agreement and authorized the Disputed Funds to be interplead without the
necessity of the parties filing a separate interpleader action. See Order Granting Motion
for Order entered April 2, 2007 [R. 2851]. DAT&K moved the Trial Court to release the
Disputed Funds to DAT&K [R. 3227]. MEI objected to DAT&K's motion and moved
the Trial Court to release the Disputed Funds to MEI [R. 003396], No other party filed a
timely response or objection to DAT&K's motion.

105562-000003
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On May 5, 2008, the Trial Court conducted a non-evidentiary hearing of the
DAT&K and MEI motions to release the Disputed Funds. The Trial Court denied both
motions finding that there is "a genuine issue of material fact regarding the nature of
GBS's interest in the funds."

See 5-8-08 Transcript at p. 56 [R.6535]. The Trial Court

also found that, if GBS had an ownership interest, a lien interest, a right to payment from,
or any other interest in the Disputed Funds, the Disputed Funds would be paid to
DAT&K. Id. at p. 57 [R. 6535].
On February 6, 2008, the Trial Court conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding
the issue of whether GBS had rights in the Disputed Funds. Following the evidentiary
hearing, the Trial Court entered the March Order awarding the Disputed Funds to
DAT&K. The Trial Court made the ultimate finding of fact that GBS had rights in the
Disputed Funds, and, therefore, DAT&K's security interest attached to the Disputed
Funds. The Trial Court also made the following subsidiary findings of fact to support its
ultimate finding:
1.

DAT&K is the secured party under a 2001 "Master Loan and

Security Agreement" pursuant to which GBS granted DAT&K a security interest in all
monies owed to GBS by its clients for attorney's fees and payment of costs and expenses
incurred in connection with the Fen-Phen cases. See March Order at pp. 1-2;
2.

GBS and its principal, Mr. Keith Barton, engaged MEI to perform

initial "screening" echocardiograms ("ECGs") on GBS's clients and, in cases where the
initial ECG resulted in the right evidence, to perform "full study" ECGs on GBS's clients.
See March Order at p. 2;
105562-000003
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3.

GBS and Mr. Barton expressly agreed in writing that GBS would be

responsible for paying all costs to MEI. See March Order at p. 6;
4.

GBS took the Fen-Phen cases on a contingency fee basis under

which GBS would receive forty percent (40%) of the client's recovery as attorney's fees
and would be paid for all costs paid or advanced by GBS out of the remaining sixty
percent (60%) of the client's recovery. See March Order at p. 3;
5.

DAT&K's security interest attached to all attorneys fees and rights to

payment and reimbursement under the contingency fee agreement between GBS and its
clients. See March Order at p. 3;
6.

The testimony of Mr. Barton, and MEFs principal, Alan Fidler,

regarding their intent was not credible. See March Order at p. 10;
7.

Mr. Fidler gave conflicting testimony regarding whether MEI had

any right to payment from any source other than GBS and Mr. Barton. See March Order
at p. 6;
8.

The conduct of Mr. Barton and MEI in the litigation between them

indicate their intent that MEI would only look to GBS and Mr. Barton for payment. See
March Order at p. 10; and
9.

The Disputed Funds did not come from the clients' sixty percent

(60%) share of the recoveries. See March Order at p. 12.
MEI moved the Trial Court to reconsider the March Order arguing that the Trial
Court erred in finding that the Disputed Funds did not come from the clients' sixty
percent (60%) share of the recoveries. In the July Order, the Trial Court agreed with MEI
105562-000003
7/2411019 1
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that the Disputed Funds came from the clients' sixty percent (60%) share of the
recoveries but reaffirmed its decision awarding the Disputed Funds to DAT&K.

The

Trial Court explained:
MEI is correct on this point in that having now reviewed the hearing
transcript, the Court finds the funds came from the 60% of the
recovery attributed to the clients1 account. The parties stipulated to
this fact and the Court amends its finding accordingly to reflect the
stipulation. However, that fact does not alter the Court's ultimate
ruling because there is a great deal more to the story as stated in the
original order ....
As stated in the Order, the funds may be from the client's 60% but still
allocated to go elsewhere, such as to reimburse Mr. Barton's firm or to
pay for the firm's obligations from which it was holding its clients
harmless under the contingent fee agreements. The Court's findings
indicate MEI had no privity with any contract that would give it a
direct right of action against the clients and Mr. Barton's firm
assumed liability for ECG costs incurred by MEL ...
***

The broad scope of DAT&K's security interest allowed it to attach to
the funds as they went through GBS or its predecessor destined for
someone other than the clients' personal bank accounts. As reflected
by the Court's findings, the settlement agreement and other documents
indicated the nature of the funds.
July Order at pp. 1 and 2 {emphasis added),
IV STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A*

The Agreement Between GBS and GBS's Clients

GBS entered into a Contingency Fee Agreement with its clients in the Fen-Phen
cases, which provided that GBS's clients would pay GBS, from the clients' sixty percent
(60%) share of the recoveries, for all costs and expenses incurred by GBS in connection

105562-000003
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with its representation.

See Trial Exhibit 11 [R.4106, 3995].

Section 4(b) of the

Contingency Fee Agreement provides as follows:
I (we) will incur various costs and expenses in performing legal
services under this Agreement. You agree to pay for all costs,
disbursements, and expense owed by you in connection with this
matter, or which have been paid or advanced by me (us) on your
behalf and for which have not previously paid or reimbursed to me
(us), if I (we) reach a settlement or judgment on your behalf, or if our
services are terminated for any reason by you.
Trial Exhibit 11 at § 4(b) {emphasis added). Moreover, the Contingency Fee Agreement
granted GBS a lien against the client's portion of any recovery to secure the client's
obligation to pay GBS for costs and expenses incurred by GBS. Section 5 of the
Contingency Fee Agreement provides as follows:
You hereby grant us a lien, as provided by Utah Code Ann. 78-51-41
(1996) on any and all claims or causes of action that are the subject of
our representation under this Agreement. My (our) lien will be for
any sums owing to me (us) for any unpaid costs, or attorneys' fees, at
the conclusion of my (our) services. The lien will attach to any
recovery you may obtain, whether by arbitration aware, judgment,
settlement or otherwise.
Trial Exhibit 11 at § 5 {emphasis added). The clients were obligated to pay GBS for the
obligations incurred by GBS to MEL

105562-000003
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B,

The Agreement Between GBS and the Texas Firms

GBS and the Texas Firms entered into that Fen-Phen Referral Agreement dated
August 6/8, 2002 (the "Fen-Phen Referral Agreement'1). See Trial Exhibit 13, p. 1
[R.4106, 3995]. The Fen-Phen Referral Agreement provided for GBS to refer Fen-Phen
cases to the Texas Firms, the division of the attorneys1 fees from those cases between
GBS and the Texas Firms and the payment of expenses and other monies related to those
cases as more fully set forth therein. Id. GBS expressly represented in the Fen-Phen
Referral Agreement "that the fee agreements with the clients are on a 40% contingency
basis plus reimbursement of costs and expenses (which are deducted from the client's
portion of the recovery)." Id. (emphasis added).
C.

The Agreement Between GBS and MEI

MEI and GBS entered into a letter agreement dated November 14, 2000 (the "MEI
Letter Agreement"). See Trial Exhibit 7 [R.4106, 3995]. The MEI Letter Agreement
provided for MEI to provide echocardiography services to GBS in connection with the
Fen-Phen cases including both initial screens and full studies. Id. The MEI Letter
Agreement also provided for GBS to make monthly payments to MEI within thirty (30)
days of GBS's receipt of the invoice from MEI. Id. Pursuant to the MEI Letter
Agreement, MEI sent monthly invoices to GBS for both the initial screens and the full
studies. See Trial Exhibit 15 [R.4106, 3995].
Following execution of the MEI Letter Agreement, MEI and GBS reached a
verbal agreement that GBS would not pay for the full studies until GBS received payment
105562-000003
7/2411019 1
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from GBSfs clients.

Mr. Alan Fidler, president and co-owner of MEI, testified as

follows:
Q. Okay. You gave me a description of that in your prior deposition.
Fll just read it to you and ask you if that was correct.
"As for the time that they were to be paid, it does not stipulate when
the full studies would be paid." Again, speaking of Exhibit 7. 'We
had a verbal understanding that the full studies would be paid when
he received payments on their cases when they settled. He didn't
have the money at the time to be paying for full studies. And as we
discussed earlier, all the financial obligation he had to borrow from
Texas. And he came to me and he told me, 'I can't pay you for the full
studies until I get paid.' And I agreed to postpone the payment until
that time."
Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that an accurate statement of your agreement?
A. Yes.
2-6-09 Trans, at p. 179 (emphasis added). According to Mr. Fidler, GBS and MEI agreed
that, when GBS received payment from its clients, GBS would pay MEI. Id.
The agreement between GBS and MEI is also evidenced by GBS's accounting
records. Mr. Hashimoto, in his capacity as receiver for GBS, took possession of, and
familiarized himself with, GBS's financial records. Mr. Hashimoto testified as follows:
Q. . . . In connection with your review of the books and records, the
financial statements of - of Gregory, Barton & Swapp, do you know
how Gregory, Barton & Swapp accounted for their obligations to
MEI? We've heard some earlier testimony that - we heard some
earlier testimony that invoices were delivered by MEI to Gregory,
Barton & Swapp on a monthly basis but those were not paid. How
were they accounted for on the books and records of Gregory, Barton
& Swapp?

105562-000003
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A. They were booked as an expense, contract labor and included as
part of their accounts payable.
Q. So that was an obligation that they had, they booked it in the
accounts payable money they owed to MEI; is that correct?
A. That's the way it was accounted on their general ledger.
Q. And if money came in from a client recovery, money came in,
how was that accounted for?
A. It was accounted for a part of the gross revenue of Gregory,
Barton & Swapp.
Q. So the monies that came in, whether they were attorneys fees or
whether they're client recovery costs, they were all accounted for as
income to Gregory, Barton & Swapp; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
2-6-09 Trans, at pp. 181-82.

GBS's accounting records make absolutely clear that

GBS's clients were obligated to pay GBS for the echocardiography services and, in turn,
GBS was obligated to pay MEI for the echocardiography services.
D.

The Absence of an Agreement Between MEI and GBSfs Clients

MEI provided the echocardiography services to GBS and looked solely to GBS for
payment. In the Settlement Agreement & Mutual Release dated September 29, 2004 (the
"MEI Settlement Agreement"), MEI and Mr. Barton expressly acknowledged that MEI
provided the echocardiography services to GBS. See Trial Exhibit 10 at p. 1, § 2
[R.4106, 3995]. Further, MEI never looked to GBS's clients for payment.

Mr. Fidler

testified that MEI did not gather any billing information for GBS's clients and never sent
any invoices to GBS's clients. See 6-2-09 Trans, at p. 128. Moreover, when asked

105562-000003
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whether MEI had a right to receive payment from the clients, Mr. Fidler testified that
MEI did not:
Q. You did not think you have a right to proceed against the clients
directly to receive payment, correct? That was your understanding,
correct?
A. Yes.
Id. at p. 135. Finally, MEI never looked to the clients' recoveries for payment. MEI
admitted that it was simply irrelevant to MEI whether GBS's clients recovered anything.
GBS owed MEI for the initial screens and the full studies regardless of whether GBS's
clients obtained any recovery. Mr. Fidler testified as follows:
Q. So is it accurate to say what happened in the underlying lawsuits
in which Gregory, Barton & Swapp represented these clients, you
were looking at Gregory, Barton & Swapp to get paid? It didn't make
any difference whether there was a recovery or not, Gregory, Barton
& Swapp owed you the money; is that correct?
A. Basically.
2-6-09 Trans, at p. 132.
GBS's clients did execute GBS Screening Information Sheet (the "Information
Sheet") that was to be filled out and signed prior to MEI performing an initial screen or a
full study. See Trial Exhibit 21 [R.4106, 3995]. By signing the Information Sheet, the
client consented to GBS and MEI performing "health care screening" and agreed to hold
GBS and MEI harmless for the results obtained.

Id.

The Information Sheet also

provided that the cost of any full study would be "deducted" from any settlement the
client later obtained. Id. The Information Sheet did not grant MEI any lien, did not
obligate the client to pay MEI and did not provide that payments withheld from the
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client's settlement would be paid to MEI. While the Information Sheet authorized a
deduction from the client's recovery, it is utterly and completely silent regarding what
was to be done with the monies deducted. Id.
At the evidentiary hearing, MEI attempted to offer testimony that GBS's clients
also executed so-called lien agreements in favor of MEI. Neither MEI nor Mr. Barton
had produced copies of these alleged lien agreements in response to DAT&K's discovery
requests and did not offer these alleged lien agreements into evidence at trial. Instead,
MEI attempted to elicit testimony from Mr. Barton and Mr. Fidler regarding the content
of these alleged lien agreements that had never been produced. DAT&K objected to the
admission of this testimony under Utah's best evidence rule codified at Rules 1001-1004
of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

See 2-6-09 Trans, at pp. 22-28. The Trial Court

sustained that objection. Id.
MEI argues in a footnote that, because testimony regarding the contents of the
Contingency Fee Agreements was admitted without the introduction of the originals or
copies of the executed Contingency Fee Agreements, the Trial Court should have also
admitted testimony regarding the alleged lien agreements. MEI Brief at p. 9, fn. 6. MEI
fails to mention the salient fact that MEI did not object to admission of the testimony
regarding the Contingency Fee Agreements whereas DAT&K objected to admission of
testimony regarding the alleged lien agreements. MEI does not argue that the Trial Court
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erred in excluding testimony regarding the alleged lien agreements under the best
evidence rule.3
E.

The Litigation Between MEI and GBS

In 2002, a dispute arose among MEI and GBS regarding the quality of the full
studies performed by MEI for GBS. See Trial Exhibit 10 at p. 1, § 2 [R.4106, 3995].
MEI filed suit against GBS seeking payment in full of the amounts GBS owed MEI for
the initial screens and full studies. Id. at p. 1, § 3. Although the principal issues in the
litigation were the quality of the full studies performed by MEI and the amount that
should be paid MEI for the full studies, neither MEI nor GBS joined GBS's clients as
parties.
GBS, Mr. Barton and MEI later entered into the MEI Settlement Agreement
resolving the litigation.

See Trial Exhibit 10 [R.4106, 3995].

Although the MEI

Settlement Agreement resolved the issues regarding the quality of the full studies and the
amount to be paid to MEI for those full studies, GBS's clients were not parties to the MEI
Settlement Agreement. Id. If MEI believed GBS's clients had any obligation whatsoever
to MEI, MEI would have been required to join GBS's clients as indispensable parties.
MEI did not do so because GBS's clients did not have an agreement with, or any
obligation to, MEI.

3

MEI makes numerous arguments regarding the alleged lien agreements even though the
Trial Court held testimony regarding the alleged hen agreements inadmissible. MEI
Brief at pp. 9-10. These arguments should be stricken. Similarly, MEI relies on the
Affidavit of Keith Barton, which the Trial Court refused to consider at the May 8, 2008,
hearing, and which was not introduced at the June 2, 2009 hearing. These arguments
should also be stricken.
105562-000003
7/2411019 1

15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The MEI Settlement Agreement provided that MEI would be paid $601,000 and
GBS would execute a promissory note in the amount of $2,050,000 (the "MEI Note").
See Trial Exhibit 10 at p. 3, § 11 [R.4106, 3995]. The Texas Firms paid the $601,000,
and the MEI Settlement Agreement treated this $601,000 payment as a nonrecoverable
expense to be paid prior to any division of attorneys' fees between GBS and the Texas
Firms. See Trial Exhibit 10 at p. 3, § 11 [R.4106, 3995] . The result of this payment to
MEI was to reduce the amount that otherwise would have been paid to GBS, and, in turn,
to DAT&K by 50% of this amount or $300,500. See 2-6-09 Trans, at pp. 193 and 229.
The MEI Note also provided for quarterly payments to MEI, and the MEI
Settlement Agreement provided a mechanism by which those payments would be made.
The MEI Settlement Agreement provided for an "Echocardiogram Expense Holdback"
under which the Texas Firms agreed to withhold $1,420.65 from any settlement or
payment of a final judgment in a case for which MEI prepared an echocardiogram and
disburse these monies to MEI when the next quarterly payment became due. Section 15
of the MEI Settlement Agreement provides as follows:
Echocardiogram Expense Hold-Back. At the request of Barton and
MEI and strictly as an accommodation to those parties, the Texas
Firms will withhold and set aside from the Barton Fen Phen Fees
earned through the representation of the Barton/MEI Referral
Cases as case expenses, the amount of $1,420.65 per
echocardiogram multiplied by the number of Barton/MEI Referral
Cases resolved subsequent to the date of execution of this Settlement
Agreement ...These monies will be held for the benefit of MEI to be
disbursed by the Texas Firms to MEI when the next quarterly payment
is due by Barton to MEI under the Note.
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See Trial Exhibit 10 at pp. 5 and 6, § 15 [R.4106, 3995] (emphasis added). The MEI
Settlement Agreement defined Barton Fen-Phen Fees as f,[a]ll fees or other monies that
shall become due to [GBS and Keith L. Barton] under the August 6/8, 2002 Fen-Phen
Referral Agreement between [GBS and Keith L. Barton] and the Texas Firms.11 Id. at p.
4, § 12. Together, Section 15 and the definition of Barton Fen-Phen Fees constitute a
clear and unambiguous acknowledgment that Barton Fen-Phen Fees, as defined in the
MEI Settlement Agreement, include amounts withheld from clients' recoveries in
connection with MEI's echocardiography services.
Pursuant to Section 15 of the MEI Settlement Agreement, the Texas Firms
withheld $87,974.16 from the clients' recoveries. See Trial Exhibit 10 at pp. 5 and 6, §
15 [R.4106, 3995]. However, the funds withheld were not sufficient to make the
quarterly payments due MEI under the MEI Note. Id. The Texas Firms paid the
additional $284,536.06 required to make five (5) quarterly payments to MEI under MEI
Note. Id. The MEI Settlement Agreement treated the $284,536.06 as a nonrecoverable
expense to be paid prior to any division of attorneys' fees between GBS and the Texas
Firms. The result of the Texas Firms paying the additional $284,536.06 to MEI was to
reduce the amount that otherwise would have been paid to GBS and, in turn, to DAT&K
by 50% of this amount or $142,268.03. See Trial Exhibits 18 and 19 [3995]; 2-6-09
Trans, at pp. 176-80.
The payments made by the Texas Firms resulted in a reduction of the amounts
GBS and, in turn, DAT&K was entitled to receive by $442,768.03. See Trial Exhibits 18
and 19 [3995]; 2-6-09 Trans, at pp. 176-80. This is the same amount as the Disputed
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Funds. These payments were made in direct violation of DAT&K's rights under its
security interest, which entitled DAT&K to payment in full prior to any payment to MEL
See Trial Exhibits 1-5 [R.4106, 3995]. Indeed, the MEI Settlement Agreement expressly
acknowledges that GBS was in default of its obligations to DAT&K's predecessor in
interest, Advocate Capital and that these payments are being made in violation of its
rights as the senior secured creditor. See Trial Exhibit 10 at pp. 5-6 [R.4106, 3995].
F.

The MEI Security Agreement

Pursuant to the MEI Settlement Agreement, GBS executed a Security Agreement
in favor of MEI (the "MEI Security Agreement") granting MEI a security interest in the
"Barton Fen-Phen Fees."

See Trial Exhibit 9 [R.4106, 3995].

The MEI Security

Agreement defined as Barton Fen-Phen Fees as follows:
[a]ll fees or other monies that shall become due to [GBS and Keith
L. Barton] under the August 6/8, 2002 Fen-Phen Referral
Agreement between [GBS and Keith L. Barton] and the Texas
Firms, or any subsequent agreement between [GBS and Keith L.
Barton] and the firms, the subject of which are the recoverable
attorneys fees arising out of the Texas Firms' representation of
certain Barton-MEI clients.
See Trial Exhibit 9 at pp. 2-3, § l.l(j) [R.4106, 3995] (emphasis added). The definition
of Barton Fen-Phen Fees contained in the MEI Security Agreement is identical to the
definition of Barton Fen-Phen Fees contained in the MEI Settlement Agreement.

As

discussed above, GBS, Barton and MEI all acknowledged in the MEI Settlement
Agreement that the term Barton Fen-Phen Fees included monies withheld from the
clients' recoveries related to MEFs services.
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The MEI Security Agreement expressly provides that MEI is not entitled to
receive any of the Barton Fen-Phen Fees unless and until DAT&K has been paid in full
The MEI Security Agreement provides as follows:
After an Event of Default has occurred, at the request of MEI, Barton
shall receive, as the sole and exclusive property of MEI and as Trustee
for MEI, subject to the Permitted Liens, all monies, checks, drafts and
all other payments for and/or Proceeds of Collateral which come into
the possession or control of Barton and immediately upon receipt
thereof, Barton shall remit the same (or cause the same to be remitted),
in kind, to MEI or at MEFs direction, except as required pursuant to
the Permitted Liens. In other words, once the obligations satisfied by
the Permitted Liens are satisfied or otherwise resolved, then MEI is
and shall be entitled to priority position against any and all other
claim to the Barton Fen Phen Fees, and shall be entitled to execute
upon the security interest granted by this Agreement upon an Event
of Default.
Trial Exhibit 9 at pp. 4 and 5, § 2.8 [R.4106, 3995] (emphasis added). The term
"Permitted Liens" is defined to include "those particular liens already given and perfected
in the Barton Fen-Phen Fees (as defined below), meaning those particular liens given and
perfected as of August 24, 2004 at 7:51 a.m." Id. at p. 2, § 1.1(e). DAT&K's security
interest was given and perfected prior to August 24, 2004. See Trial Exhibits 1-5
[R.4106, 3995]. The MEI Security Agreement expressly provides that MEI has no
rights whatsoever to any of the Barton Fen-Phen Fees and, therefore, no right to any
portion of the monies withheld from the clients9 recoveries, unless and until DAT&K is
paid in full.
G.

MEPs Receipt of All Amounts Withheld from Clients' Recoveries

Assuming arguendo that MEI had an interest in the funds withheld from the
clients' portion of the recoveries, the most that MEI could ever have conceivably been
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paid prior to DAT&K being paid in full was the amount actually withheld from the
clients' portion of the recoveries. It is undisputed that DAT&K held a security interest in
all other monies owned to GBS and was entitled to be paid in full from those monies
prior to MEI. The Texas Firms deducted a total of $1,070,517.16 from the clients'
portion of the recoveries in connection with MEFs services pursuant to the fee
agreements between GBS, the Texas Firms and GBS's clients. See Trial Exhibits 18 and
19 [R. 3995]; 6-2-09 Trans, at 176-180. Without taking into account the Disputed Funds,
the Texas Firms and GBS have paid MEI an amount equal to the $1,070,517.16 deducted
from the clients' portion of the recoveries.

Id. The Texas Firms deducted a total of

$1,070,517.16 from the clients' portion of the recoveries related to MEFs services, and
the Texas Firms paid MEI $1,070,517.16. Id. Moreover, as discussed above, it is
undisputed that the Texas Firms made payments to MEI that violated DAT&K's rights as
a secured creditor and reduced the amount DAT&K would have received by the same
amount as the Disputed Funds. Id. If MEI receives any of the Disputed Funds, MEI will
receive more than it could have ever been entitled to receive prior to payment of DAT&K
in full and would have effectively and impermissibly primed DAT&K's security interest.
V SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court's finding that GBS had rights in the Disputed Funds is not clearly
erroneous. The documents and testimony discussed in the Statement of Facts above is
more than a scintilla and more than sufficient to support the Trial Court's finding that
GBS had rights in the Disputed Funds. MEI makes no attempt to marshal the evidence
supporting the Trial Court's finding that GBS had rights in the Disputed Funds. Instead,
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GBS ignores virtually all the documents and testimony discussed in the Statement of
Facts above and reargues the factual case MEI presented at trial. Consequently, the Trial
Court's decision must be affirmed.
VI. ARGUMENT
A-

The Trial Court's Finding that GBS Had Rights in the Disputed Funds

is Not Clearly Erroneous.
The documents and testimony discussed in the Statement of Facts above establish
that GBS was entitled to receive payment from its clients for the costs and expenses GBS
incurred, including the expenses GBS incurred for MEFs services and, therefore, GBS
had rights in the Disputed Funds. First, as discussed more fully above, Section 4(b) of
the Contingency Fee Agreement provides that GBS will incur costs and expenses on
behalf of its clients and that its clients will pay GBS for costs and expenses "paid or
advanced" by GBS from the clients' share of any recovery. Second, the Contingency Fee
Agreement grants GBS a lien on the client's portion of the recovery to secure the client's
obligation to pay GBS for any "unpaid costs" incurred by GBS. Even if the Contingency
Fee Agreement had not expressly granted GBS a lien, GBS is entitled to such a lien by
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7. Finally, GBS expressly represented to the Texas
Firms in the Fen-Phen Referral Agreement that the Contingency Fee Agreement provided
for a contingency fee of forty percent (40%) and payment of costs and expenses incurred
by GBS.
MEI argues that, under the Contingency Fee Agreement, GBS could not have
become entitled to payment from its clients for MEFs services until GBS had paid MEI.
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First, MEFs argument ignores the plain language of the Contingency Fee Agreement
which requires the client to pay GBS for expenses "paid or advanced" and for "unpaid"
costs. The Contingency Fee Agreement does not require that expenses be paid prior to
the clients paying GBS for expenses incurred. Second, MEFs argument ignores Mr.
Fidler's testimony that MEI and GBS agreed GBS would pay MEI whenever GBS
received payment from GBS's clients. This testimony is fatal to any argument that GBS
had to pay MEI before it became entitled to payment from GBS's clients or that GBS's
clients would pay MEI directly.

Third, MEFs argument ignores Mr. Hashimoto's

testimony that, under applicable accounting standards, GBS did not have to pay MEI to
become entitled to payment from GBS's clients. According to Mr. Hashimoto, GBS's
right to payment from clients arose when GBS incurred the obligation to MEI. Finally,
MEFs argument ignores the fact that GBS accounted for its obligations to MEI as
accounts payable when incurred and accounted for any payments from client recoveries
for MEFs services as income when received.
MEI ignores the fact that MEI has already received payment in an amount equal to
the amount withheld from the clients' recoveries for MEFs services. The Texas Firms
deducted a total of $1,070,517.16 from the clients' portion of the recoveries in connection
with MEFs services and paid MEI $1,070,517.16. MEI argues that the $601,000 paid to
MEI should not be considered because it was applied to the initial screens rather than the
full studies. Even if this point is true, it is entirely irrelevant. Regardless of how the
funds were applied, the effect was the same. If MEI receives any of the Disputed Funds,
it will have received more than the amount withheld from the clients1 recoveries and that
105562-000003
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excess will have been paid from DAT&K's collateral. MEI will have effectively primed
DAT&K's security interest in violation of the provisions of Article 9 of the UCC.
Further, the documents and testimony discussed in the Statement of Facts above
establish that MEI had no right to payment from GBS's clients and never looked to
GBS's clients or their recoveries for payment. MEI looked only to GBS for payment.
First, MEI had no written agreement with GBS's clients. MEFs only agreement was with
GBS. Second, MEI never gathered any billing information for GBS's clients and never
sent an invoice to any GBS client. MEI sent its invoices to GBS. Third, GBS agreed to
pay MEI regardless of whether GBS's clients obtained any recovery. Mr. Fidler admitted
that it was irrelevant to MEI whether GBS's clients obtained any recovery or not. Fourth,
when a dispute arose over the quality of MEI's services and the amount owed to MEI,
MEI did not sue GBS's clients. MEI sued GBS. Finally, GBS's clients were not parties
to the MEI Settlement Agreement resolving that litigation. There was no reason for MEI
to join GBS's clients since, as MEI acknowledged in the MEI Settlement Agreement,
MEI provided its services to GBS and GBS owed MEI for those services.
Finally, MEI and Mr. Barton expressly acknowledged and agreed in the MEI
Settlement Agreement and the MEI Security Agreement that monies withheld from the
clients' portion of the recoveries in connection with MEI's services are part of DAT&K's
collateral.

First, the MEI Settlement Agreement and the MEI Security Agreement

granted MEI a security interest in the "Barton Fen-Phen Fees." The Barton Fen-Phen
Fees are defined as fees and "other monies" due GBS under the Fen-Phen Referral
Agreement. The fact is that the phrase "other monies" referred to monies withheld from
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the clients' portion of the recoveries to pay GBS for the expenses it had incurred.
Second, the MEI Settlement Agreement expressly provides that monies withheld from the
clients1 portion of the recoveries in connection with MEFs services were included within
tl K : < k ;fn litioi i of Bai tor i F< :;i i PI lei 1 Fees. Finally , be >th tl; ic N II; il Settlement Agreement and
the MEI Security Agreement expressly acknowledge that DAT&K held a security interest
in the Barton Fen Phen Fees and that DAT&K's security interest is senior to MEFs
seci irily interest.
B,

Fhe Trial Court Was Not Bound to Accept Conclusory Statements of

Subjective Intent From Witnesses that Were Not Credible.
MEI argues that the Trial ( x >i in I. w; is boi it id to accept as ti ue Mi Fidler's ai id Mi
Barton's conclusory statements regarding their subjective intent. To the contrary, the
Trial Court found that Mr. Barton and Mr. Fidler were not credible witnesses, that Mr.
Fidler gave conflicting testimony regarding theii intei it and tl lat tl i.eii testii noi ly was
inconsistent with both the agreements and their conduct. The Trial Court's determination
that Mr. Barton and Mr. Fidler were not credible is entitled to great deference from this
Court. Visser, UT App. at ]\ 12, 31 P.2d at 586. Moreover, Utah c oi it ts have long recognized
tlla! in determining the intent of the parties to an agreement, courts may look to the
language of the agreements and the conduct of the parties. See, e.g., Green River Canal
Co. v. Thavn, 84 P.2d 1134, 1141 (Utah 2003); Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State
Lands and Forestry. 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). As the Trial Court found, the
absence of any agreement betweeii MEI and GBS's clients regarding payment, and the
language of the other agreements evidence that GBS was entitled
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lien on, the clients' portion of the recoveries. Moreover, as the Trial Court found, the
conduct of the parties evidences that GBS was entitled to be paid from, and held a lien
on, the clients' portion of the recoveries and that MEI had no interest in, right to, or claim
against GBS's clients or their recoveries. GBS treated as income the monies withheld
from the clients' recoveries and paid to GBS for the obligations GBS had incurred to
MEL Moreover, when a dispute arose over the quality of MEI's services and the amount
GBS owed MEI for those services, MEI did not join the clients as parties to the litigation
or the settlement agreement resolving that litigation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the facts and arguments set forth above, this Court should affirm the
Trial Court's decision awarding the Disputed Funds to DAT&K.
DATED this ^ d a y of August, 2010.

BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP

By:

J/
ix G. Jop€s
Atfbmeyyfor Appellee DAT&K
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Hand Delivery
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Westlaw
T. C. A. § 47-9-203

Page 1

c
West's Tennessee Code Annotated Currentness
Title 47. Commercial Instruments and Transactions
Chapter 9. Secured Transactions (Refs & Annos)
*ig] Part 2. Effectiveness of Security Agreement; Attachment of Security Interest; Rights of Parties to Security
Agreement (Refs & Annos)
*il Subpart 1. . Effectiveness and Attachment
-• § 47-9-203. Attachment and enforceability of security interest; proceeds; supporting obligations;
formal requisites
(a) ATTACHMENT. A security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes enforceable against the debtor with
respect to the collateral, unless an agreement expressly postpones the time of attachment.
(b) ENFORCEABILITY. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) through (i), a security interest is enforceable
against the debtor and third parties with respect to the collateral only if:
(1) value has been given;
(2) the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party; and
(3) one (I) of the following conditions is met:
(A) the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral and, if the security
interest covers timber to be cut, a description of the land concerned;
(B) the collateral is not a certificated security and is in the possession of the secured party under §47-9-313 pursuant
to the debtor's security agreement;
(C) the collateral is a certificated security in registered form and the security certificate has been delivered to the
secured party under § 47-8-301 pursuant to the debtor's security agreement; or
(D) the collateral is deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, investment property, or letter-of-credit rights, or
electronic documents, and the secured party has control under § 47-7-106, § 47-9-104, $ 47-9-105, § 47-9-106, or £
47-9-107 pursuant to the debtor's security agreement.
(c) OTHER UCC PROVISIONS. Subsection (b) is subject to ^ 47-4-210 on the security interest of a collecting bank,
§ 47-5-118 on the security interest of a letter-of-credit issuer or nominated person, § 47-9-110 on a security interest
arising under Chapter 2 or 2A, and § 47-9-206 on security interests in investment property.
(d) WHEN PERSON BECOMES BOUND BY ANOTHER PERSON'S SECURITY AGREEMENT. A person becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person if, by operation of law other than this
chapter or by contract:
(1) the security agreement becomes effective to create a security interest in the person's property; or
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T. C. A. § 47-9-203

Page 2

(2) the person becomes generally obligated for the obligations of the other person, including the obligation secured
under the security agreement, and acquires or succeeds to all or substantially all of the assets of the other person.
(e) EFFECT OF NEW DEBTOR BECOMING BOUND. If a new debtor becomes bound as debtor by a security
agreement entered into by another person:
(1) the agreement satisfies subsection (b)(3) with respect to existing or after-acquired property of the new debtor to the
extent the property is described in the agreement; and
(2) another agreement is not necessary to make a security interest in the property enforceable.
(0 PROCEEDS AND SUPPORTING OBLIGATIONS. The attachment of a security interest in collateral gives the
secured party the rights to proceeds provided by $47-9-315 and is also attachment of a security interest in a supporting
obligation for the collateral.
(g) LIEN SECURING RIGHT TO PAYMENT. The attachment of a security interest in a right to payment or performance secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property is also attachment of a security interest in the security interest, mortgage, or other lien.
(h) SECURITY ENTITLEMENT CARRIED IN SECURITIES ACCOUNT. The attachment of a security interest in a
securities account is also attachment of a security interest in the security entitlements carried in the securities account.
(i) COMMODITY CONTRACTS CARRIED IN COMMODITY ACCOUNT. The attachment of a security interest in
a commodity account is also attachment of a security interest in the commodity contracts carried in the commodity
account.
CREDIT(S)
2000 Pub.Acts, c. 846, g L eff. July L 2001: 2008 Pub.Acts, c. 814, § 26, cff. July 1, 2008.
Current through end of 2010 First Ex. Sess. and with laws from 2010 Reg. Sess., eff. through June 9, 2010
(c) 2010 Thomson Reuters.
END OF DOCUMENT
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U C A 1953 § 70A-9a-203

Page 1

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 70A Uniform Commercial Code (Refs & Annos)
*ii Chapter 9A Uniform Commercial Code-Secured Transactions (Refs & Annos)
K
& Part 2 Effectiveness of Security Agreement—Attachment of Security Interest-Rights of Parties to Security
Agreement
-+ § 70A-9a-203. Attachment and enforceability of security interest—Proceeds-Supporting obligations—Formal requisites
(1) A security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral, unless an agreement expressly postpones the time of attachment
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (3) through (9), a security interest is enforceable against the debtor
and third parties with respect to the collateral only if
(a) value has been given,
(b) the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party, and
(c) one of the following conditions is met
(i) the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral and, if the security interest covers timber to be cut, a description of the land concerned,
(ii) the collateral is not a certificated security and is in the possession of the secured party under Section
70A-9a-313 pursuant to the debtor's security agreement
(m) the collateral is a certificated security in registered form and the security certificate has been delivered to the
secured party under Section 7QA-8-3Q1 pursuant to the debtor's security agreement, or
(iv) the collateral is deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, investment property, or letter-of-credit rights, or
electronic documents, and the secured party has control under Section 70A-7a-106, 70A-9a-104, 70A-9a-105,
70A-9a-106, or 70A-9a-107 pursuant to the debtor's security agreement
(3) Subsection (2) is subject to Section 7QA-4-21Q on the security interest of a collecting bank, Section 7QA-5-118 on
the security interest of a letter-of-credit issuer or nominated person, Section 70A-9a-l 10 on a security interest arising
under Chapter 2 or 2a, and Section 70A-9a-206 on security interests in investment property
(4) A person becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person if, by operation of law
other than this chapter or by contract
(a) the security agreement becomes effective to create a secunt) interest in the person's property, or
(b) the person becomes generally obligated for the obligations of the other person, including the obligation secured
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under the security agreement, and acquires or succeeds to all or substantially all of the assets of the other person.
(5) If a new debtor becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person:
(a) the agreement satisfies Subsection (2)(c) with respect to existing or after-acquired property of the new debtor to
the extent the property is described in the agreement; and
(b) another agreement is not necessary to make a security interest in the property enforceable.
(6) The attachment of a security interest in collateral gives the secured party the rights to proceeds provided by Section
7QA-9a-315 and is also attachment of a security interest in a supporting obligation for the collateral.
(7) The attachment of a security interest in a right to payment or performance secured by a security interest or other
lien on personal or real property is also attachment of a security interest in the security interest, mortgage, or other lien.
(8) The attachment of a security interest in a securities account is also attachment of a security interest in the security
entitlements carried in the securities account.
(9) The attachment of a security interest in a commodity account is also attachment of a security interest in the
commodity contracts carried in the commodity account.
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